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provided goods in a setting where local democracies compete for people.  We identify 
two potential sources – the relationship between individual mobility and willingness to 
pay for publicly provided goods, and the mobility distribution of individuals (i.e. the 
distribution of individuals over residential preferences).  The two could reinforce each 
other in a local democracy if the majority of the residents in a community are relatively 
mobile (the “American” case), while they would pull in opposite directions if the 
majority of residents are relatively immobile (the “European” case). 
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 2
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for studying local public goods 
supply and tax competition between jurisdictions in a context where there are gains 
from geographic agglomeration and where labour is imperfectly mobile. Thus, the 
paper brings together the literature on local public finance (Tiebout (1956)), Wilson 
(1986) and the so-called new economic geography literature (Krugman (1991), 
Krugman and Venables (1995), Venables (1996)) , and it does so in a “European” con-
text in which there are strong preferences for place of residence, and correspondingly 
limited mobility of individuals (Faini et. al. (2000)). 
 
Much of the traditional literature on tax competition focuses on taxation of capital 
income, and a central result is that local or regional tax autonomy will lead to a tax 
“race to the bottom” (see Wilson (1999) for a survey).  A number of papers in the new-
economic-geography tradition have challenged this result, arguing that industrial 
agglomeration, by generating rents that can be taxed and hysteresis that reduces the 
effective mobility of capital, could just as easily generate a “race to the top” (e.g. Kind, 
Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), Baldwin and Krugman (2003)). 
 
There is a similar, traditional presumption that tax competition will give lower taxes on 
labour income if individuals are mobile (Sinn (2003), Honkapohja and Turunen-Red 
(2004)).  Again, this could be reversed in the presence of agglomerations.  Andersson 
and Forslid (2003) use a model with immobile and mobile workers to show that there 
will not be a tax race to the bottom for mobile workers and that taxes on immobile 
workers will actually be biased upwards. 
 
Our paper brings together the insights from the traditional approach, with its focus on 
fiscal externalities, and the insights from the agglomeration externalities of the new-
economic-geography literature.  Combining the two, we show that local autonomy with 
respect to taxation and public provision of goods will give too high or too low taxes 
(compared to a global optimum) depending on whether the willingness to pay for the 
average publicly provided good increases or decreases with the mobility of the 
individual, and we show that this result holds even if there are no economies of scale in 
the publicly provided goods (and thus no fiscal externality); i.e. even if local authorities 
provide purely private goods produced with constant returns to scale. As most goods 
provided by local authorities are of that kind, we feel that our model provides a more 
meaningful framework for understanding the nature of competition between 
communities than models that focus on purely fiscal externalities. 
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At the same time, we also assume that local decisions are based on majority voting, so 
that it is the interests of the median local voter which determines taxes and the supply 
of publicly provided goods.  This adds another source of possible bias.  We show that if 
the willingness to pay for publicly provided goods varies systematically with the 
mobility of the individual, the public-choice bias will reinforce the tax-competition bias 
if mobility is relatively high (what we call the “American” case), while the public-
choice bias will counteract the tax-competition bias if mobility is relatively low (the 
“European” case).  To the extent that the total distortion is smaller if the two pull in 
opposite directions than if they pull in the same direction, therefore, there should be 
less reason for concern about possible distortions in the European than in the American 
case.  
 
We model agglomeration gains in the simplest possible manner, by assuming that indi-
viduals consume a bundle of locally produced, differentiated products, produced by 
monopolistically competitive firms and modelled along Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz lines 
(Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)).   Because consumers value variety, and the 
range of products available will be larger the larger the local market, this creates 
agglomeration gains.  These will be reinforced if there are economies of scale in the 
supply of goods provided by local authorities - i.e. if local authorities provide pure 
public goods or private goods with scale economies. 
 
The agglomeration forces are counteracted by residential preferences.  We assume that 
individuals differ both as to where they prefer to work and live, and in the degree to 
which they prefer one place to another.  We capture this by an index measuring how 
highly a consumer values a particular choice.  All individuals are assumed to have the 
same utility function defined over this index, the supply of public goods, and 
consumption of private, differentiated goods. 
 
In the paper, we use this framework to look at a two-community equilibrium.  Labour is 
the only factor of production in the model, and individuals have to make a joint 
decision on where to work and live.  Equilibrium obtains when the marginal resident 
has nothing to gain from moving to the other community.  There are clearly two 
possible outcomes.  One is agglomeration in one community.  That will happen if the 
agglomeration gains are sufficiently strong relative to the dispersion and intensity of 
residential preferences.  The other possibility, on which we focus, is that the loss in 
residential surplus that the marginal individual would incur by moving is greater than 
the marginal gain from agglomeration.  In that case, there will be a stable, interior 
equilibrium - i.e. geographical dispersion. 
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In an interior equilibrium, each community will gain from attracting new residents.  
Thus, the framework lends itself to the study of competition for residents between 
communities.  The instruments available are publicly provided goods and local tax 
rates.  We assume that no discrimination is possible, so all publicly provided goods are 
provided in equal quantities to all residents and everyone pays the same tax.  If so, a 
community can only make itself more attractive to new residents if marginal residents 
differ from non-marginal ones in their willingness to pay for public goods.  If potential 
immigrants are more tax-averse than current residents, a community can attract new 
residents by reducing the supply of public goods and lowering tax rates; if they value 
public goods more highly than the natives, immigration will be stimulated by raising 
taxes and increasing the public goods supply. 
 
The resulting game between the communities will, therefore, be systematically biased 
towards overprovision of publicly provided goods that the most mobile individuals 
value more highly than the less mobile ones, and towards underprovision of publicly 
provided goods with the opposite characteristic.  
 
 
The general model 
 
The model has L individuals, each endowed with one unit of labour, which is the only 
factor of production. Individuals are mobile between communities, and move to the 
community where their total utility will be highest.   
 
Preferences and consumer choice 
 
The utility of an individual depends on three factors: The place of residence, the 
consumption of publicly provided local goods, and the consumption of private goods.   
 
The utility person h  gets when living in community i  is 
 
(1) Ui
h = U αih,gi ,ci( ), 
 
where αih  measures the intensity of his preference for living in community i  (assumed 
to differ between individuals); and where gi  and ci  denote his consumption of publicly 
provided and private goods, respectively.   
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We take gi  to be a single good provided in equal quantities to all residents by the local 
authority in community i .  It could be a pure public good or a private good with or 
without economies of scale in production.  Publicly provided goods are financed by 
local taxes, levied in a non-discriminatory fashion on local residents.  
 
Private goods are not traded, which means that consumers are limited to the range of 
locally produced goods.  Consumption of private goods, ci , is an aggregate of 
differentiated products.  It will be the same for all individuals living at i , since they all 
supply the same amount of labour, pay the same amount of taxes, and face the same 
prices and product range. 
  
We model product differentiation in the original Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz fashion.  Let eki  
be per capita consumption of variety k  in community i , and let ϕ(eki)  be the sub-utility 
from consuming this amount.  We make the usual assumptions about ϕ(eki) ; it is an 
increasing and concave function ( ′ ϕ > 0;  ′ ′ ϕ < 0).  The consumption aggregate ci , 
which may be thought of as a quantity index, is defined as 
 
(2) ci ≡ ϕ(eki)
k =1
ni∑  
 
where ni  is the number of different varieties produced in community i . 
 
Let xki  denote total production of variety k  in community i .  As private goods are not 
traded, and everyone within the community consumes equal amounts of private goods, 
per capita consumption of variety k  must be 
 
(3) eki = xkiLi , 
 
where Li  is the number of consumers in community i .  Inserting (3) into (2) gives per 
capita consumption of private differentiated goods as 
 
(4) ci = ϕ xkiLi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ k =1
ni∑ . 
 
 
The private sector 
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In the private sector a number of identical firms produce differentiated consumption 
goods.  There are increasing returns to scale in the production of each variety, and these 
are sufficiently high to ensure that each firm produces only one variety and that each 
variety is produced by one firm only.  The number of firms thus equals the number of 
different varieties.   
 
Utility maximisation gives the first order conditions for optimal choice of eki  as 
 
(5) Uc ′ ϕ (eki) = λpki , 
 
where pki  is the price of variety k , and λ  the marginal utility of income. 
 
Inserting (3) into (5) and rewriting gives the inverse demand functions  
 
(6) pki = Ucλ ′ ϕ 
xki
Li
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ , 
 
where xki  is the output of firm k .   
 
Let b(xki)  be the cost function of firm k .  The profits are then 
 
(7) π ki = pkixki − b(xki ). 
 
We make Chamberlain’s large-group assumption that the number of firms is so large 
that each firm takes the aggregate ci  as given.  From the point of view of an individual 
firm, the term Uc / λ   in equation (6) is then a constant.  Inserting (6) into (7) gives the 
profits of firm k  as 
 
(8) π ki = Ucλ ′ ϕ 
xki
Li
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ xki − b(xki ). 
 
The first order condition for profit maximisation, marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost, becomes 
 
(9) pki + Ucλ ′ ′ ϕ 
1
Li
xki = ′ b , 
 
or, rewriting,  
 
 7
(10) pki 1+ ′ ′ ϕ eki′ ϕ 
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ = ′ b . 
 
There is free entry and exit in the private sector.  New firms will enter until the 
marginal firm earns zero profits.  As firms are identical, the zero-profit condition must 
hold for all firms in equilibrium, 
 
(11) π ki = pkixki − b(xki ) = 0 , 
 
which implies 
 
(12) pki = b(xki)xki . 
 
In equilibrium, both the marginal-revenue-equal-marginal-cost (equation (10)) and the 
zero-profit condition (equation (12)) must hold, which gives the following equilibrium 
condition: 
 
(13) 
′ b 
1 + ′ ′ ϕ eki′ ϕ 
= b
xki
. 
 
Here, − ′ ϕ ′ ′ ϕ eki  is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of private 
goods.   
 
Assume that the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is constant and 
equal to σ .  Assume also that there are increasing returns to scale in the production of 
each variety, as represented by the linear labour-requirement function 
 
(14) A + Bxki . 
 
Total costs are nominal wages times labour input, 
 
(15) b(xki) = wi(A + Bxki) . 
 
Inserting (14) and (15) into (13) gives the following equilibrium condition: 
 
(16) ( )1−= σ
B
Axki . 
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We are free to choose units such that  
 
(17) A ≡ 1σ ,   B ≡
σ −1
σ . 
 
The supply of each firm is then 
 
(18) xki =1, 
 
and the price of each variety 
 
(19) pki = wi . 
 
Each firm supplies one unit of its exclusive variety, and the price of each variety is 
equal to the nominal wage rate in the community. 
 
Note that the labour requirement of each firm is (inserting (17) and (18) into (14)) 
 
(20) A + Bxki =1. 
 
One unit of labour is needed to produce one unit of each variety.  As each firm 
produces one unit of its exclusive variety, the number of private firms/different 
varieties equals the number of workers in the private sector; i.e. in  denotes both the 
number of firms and the number of workers in the private sector. 
 
 
The public sector 
 
The residents of each community are provided with some local public goods; pure 
public goods or publicly provided private goods.  Everyone living in a community 
consumes the same amount, gi , of these goods.  The production of local public goods is 
financed by local taxation of the residents of the community.  Everyone living in a 
community pays the same amount of taxes.   
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Labour is the only factor of production.  Let h(Li )gi  be the labour requirement function 
of the public sector.  The nature of local public goods, whether they are pure public 
goods or publicly provided private goods, is reflected in the term h(Li ).    
 
If ′ h (Li) = 0, then gi  is a pure public good, i.e. a good for which there is no rivalry in 
consumption. If ′ h (Li) > 0 , gi  is a publicly provided private good in the sense that if 
one more person is to consume the good, others must reduce their consumption, 
everything else equal.  One reason for the government to supply private goods is that 
there are increasing returns to scale in the production of these goods.  That will be the 
case when h(Li) /Li   is decreasing in iL . 
 
Population and real income 
 
There are Li  inhabitants in community i , of which h(Li )gi  work in the public sector.  
The number of workers in the private sector is therefore Li − h(Li)gi .  The number of 
private firms equals the number of workers in the private sector, so the number of 
private firms must also be ni = Li − h(Li)gi . 
 
Inserting for ni  and xki  in equation (4), we see that per capita consumption of private 
goods is 
 
(21) ci = Li − h(Li )gi[ ]ϕ 1Li
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ≡ c
i(gi , Li ). 
 
Note that 
 
(22) ∂c
i
∂gi = −h(Li)ϕ
1
Li
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ < 0. 
   
The effect of increasing the provision of public goods per capita, everything else equal, 
is that the consumption of differentiated goods per capita is reduced.  The production of 
local public goods  is financed by an equal tax on the residents of the community.  As 
the production of public goods increase, so do the costs of public goods production.  
This leads to increased taxes per capita as long as the number of inhabitants remains 
unchanged.  After-tax income is therefore reduced, leading to reduced consumption of 
private differentiated goods.  The tax effect is equivalent to h(Li ) units of labour.  
Because output per firm is given, the entire reduction in private consumption takes the 
form of a reduction in the number of product varieties available.  Increased public 
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employment gives a one-to-one reduction in the number of private firms, and thus in the 
number of product varieties.  This is reflected in the term ϕ(1 Li)  in (22).  Note that 
this means that the social marginal cost of publicly provided goods is higher than the 
private marginal cost, which is simply h(Li ). 
 
From (21) we also find the relationship between private consumption and the size of the 
community: 
 
 
  
∂ci
∂Li = Li − hgi( ) − ′ ϕ 
1
Li
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ + ϕ 1− ′ h gi( )  
 
i.e. 
 
(23) 
  
∂ci
∂Li =
ci
Li
1 − β( )+ gi h Li( )− ′ h [ ]
1 − gi(h Li )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥  with β ≡
′ ϕ ei
ϕ  
 
  
This has an instructive interpretation.  The term ( )β−1  captures the real, positive 
externality - i.e. gain from agglomeration: More residents means a larger local market, 
and thus a wider selection of products.  It also means that consumption of each variety 
is reduced, but the net effect is positive.  The second term in brackets captures the fiscal 
externality.  If there are economies of scale in publicly provided goods, the marginal 
labour requirement will be lower than the average requirement, so the second term will 
be positive.  The economic reason is simply that more people in that case means lower 
taxes per capita.   
 
Inserting (21) into (1) gives the utility of individual h  in community i  as 
 
(24) Ui
h = U αih,gi ,ci(gi , Li )( ). 
 
 
Migration and geographic equilibrium  
 
Now, consider a country consisting of two communities.  Each local community is 
formally like the one described in the previous section.  In each community there are 
two sectors, a private and a public, producing goods consumed locally.  Publicly 
provided goods are financed by local taxation, whereas the after-tax wage is used for 
consumption of private differentiated goods.  People are mobile between communities, 
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and settle in the community where their total utility will be highest.  Total utility 
depends on consumption and on the place of living per se.  To proceed with the analysis 
we need to specify these locational preferences in some more detail.   
 
Assume that the utility from living in community 1, α1 , is distributed on the interval 
− 1 2( ), 1 2( )[ ], and that α2 =-α1 .  A person who very highly values living in community 
1 (α1  is close to 1/2), has an equally strong dislike of living in community 2 (α2  is 
close to -1/2).  The distribution of α1  is illustrated in figure 1.  α1  is measured along 
the horizontal axis, and increases as we move from left to right.  (As α2 =-α1 , α2  is 
also measured along the horizontal axis, but increases as we move from right to left.)  
The total number of people in the country, L , is given by the total area under the curve 
f (α1); i.e.  
 
 L = f (α1)dα1
− 1
2
1
2∫ .  
 
We shall be concerned with 
symmetric equilibria only, so 
we assume that the distribu-
tion is symmetric.  We 
distinguish between two ca-
ses – one where there are 
more people with strong 
residential preferences than 
the number of people with 
weak preferences, in which 
case the distribution is u-
shaped; and one where most 
people have weak residential 
preferences, in which case 
the distribution is bell-
shaped.  The two are illu-
strated in figure 1. 
 
A person settles in com-
munity 1 if (and only if) 
U1
h > U2h . This can give rise 
either to an interior equili-
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brium in which there are residents in both communities, or to complete agglomeration 
in one community.  We focus on the former.   
 
In an interior equilibrium, the utility of the marginal individual must be the same in 
both communities, so we must have 
 
(25) U α1M ,g1,c1( )= U −α1M ,g2 ,c2( ). 
 
where M  denotes the marginal inhabitant.  Let F(α1M ) be the number of people for 
whom α1 ≥ α1M ; i.e. F(α1M ) is the number of inhabitants in community 1.  Then 
 
 L1 = F(α1M ) = L − f (α1)dα1
− 1
2
α1M∫  
 
To find the critical value of α1 , invert F(α1M ):  
 
 α1M = G(L1) ≡ F −1 L1( ) 
 
Inserting for α1M  in (25), the equilibrium condition becomes  
 
(26) U G(L1),g1,c1( )= U −G(L1 ), g2 ,c2( ). 
 
The interior equilibrium is not necessarily stable.  If the utility difference U1
M −U2M  
increases with L1, the equilibrium implied by (26) is unstable in the sense that a small 
deviation will induce massive immigration or emigration.     
 
Thus, the condition for an interior equilibrium to be stable is that 
 
(27) 
d U G(L1 ), g1,c
1(g1, L1 )( )− U −G(L1),g2 ,c2 (g2, L2 )( )[ ]
dL1
< 0, 
 
Carrying out the differentiation in (27) gives 
 
(28) Uα
1 GL +Uα2GL( )+ Uc1 ∂c1∂L1 + Uc2
∂c2
∂L2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ < 0 . 
 
Consider a symmetric equilibrium, so Uα
1 = Uα2 ≡ Uα  and Uc1 = Uc2 ≡ Uc .  Equation (29) 
then reduces to 
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(29) 2UαGL + 2Uc ∂c
i
∂Li < 0.  
 
i.e.  
 
(30) ∂c
i
∂Li <
Uα
Uc
GL . 
 
The term on the left-hand side is the marginal gain from agglomeration (which by (23) 
is the sum of the real and fiscal externalities).  To interpret the right-hand side, note that 
in the symmetric equilibrium, everyone lives in the community for which they have a 
residential preference (i.e. α1M = 0), so if one community is to grow, someone must 
move from the place they prefer to the place in which they would rather not live.  The 
first term is the compensation necessary to induce one person to move from their 
preferred location to the other.  The stability condition, therefore, is that the necessary 
compensation must be greater than the marginal gain from agglomeration. 
 
Whether or not a symmetric equilibrium will be stable clearly depends on the size of 
the agglomeration gains.  It is also depends on the intensity of residential preferences 
(Uα Uc ) and on the preference distribution of individuals.  With an “American” 
distribution, where most people have weak residential preferences, there are many 
people with preferences close those of the marginal resident, so GL = dα1 dL1( ) is 
small; with a “European” distribution, it is large.  Thus, we are more likely to have a 
stable, symmetric equilibrium in the latter case. 
 
 
Local public finance and tax competition 
 
We now have the framework needed to discuss whether there will be over-, under-, or 
optimal supply of local public goods in a federal system of competing local commu-
nities, and whether the distribution of residents will be optimal.   
 
National optimum 
 
Consider first the national optimum.  We shall not be concerned with distributional 
issues, so let us assume an additive national welfare function 
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(31) W = U α1,g1,c1( )
α1M
1
2∫ f (α1)dα1 + U −α1,g2,c2( )
− 1
2
α1M∫ f (α1)dα1 
 
The national optimum is found by maximising (31) with respect to α1 , g1 and g2, 
taking into account the effects on private consumption in each region.  
 
Consider first the optimum condition with respect to α1 - i.e. the optimum size of each 
community.  If the size of the community did not matter for consumption per capita – 
i.e. if there were no real or fiscal externalities – the first-order condition with respect to 
α1 would be  
 
(32) ∂W∂α1 = −U α1,g1,c1( ) f (α1) + U −α1,g2,c2( ) f (α1) = 0 
 
i.e. that the utility of the marginal inhabitant should be the same in both communities.  
With a symmetric distribution this means that each community will have the same 
number of inhabitants.  But if so, a small deviation from (32) will have exactly 
offsetting effects on welfare in the two communities – per capita consumption in the 
community which gets an extra individual will rise by exactly the same amount as per 
capita consumption will fall in the community which loses an individual – so (32) must 
be the first-order condition for the optimum population distribution with externalities as 
well. 
 
It is also seen from (32) that the second-order condition for a geographic optimum – 
and thus the condition for an interior solution – is that the utility differential between 
the two communities, taking into account the effects on consumption, is declining in α1.  
That is the same condition as the stability condition for a symmetric market equilibrium 
(condition (30) above).  We assume that this condition is satisfied. 
 
The first-order conditions for public goods supplies are 
 
(33) 
∂W
∂g1 = Ug + Uc
∂c1
∂g1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ α1M
1
2∫ f (α1)dα1 = 0  
 
(34) ∂W∂g2 = Ug + Uc
∂c2
∂g2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ − 1
2
α1M∫ f (α1)dα1 = 0 
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These are the usual first order conditions regarding optimal supply of public goods: The 
sum of the marginal rates of substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation.  
Another way of writing (33) and (34 ) is 
 
(33´) 
Ug
A
Uc
A = − ∂c
1
∂g1 , 
 
(34´)  
Ug
A
Uc
A = − ∂c
2
∂g2 , 
 
where A  refers to the average inhabitant.  (The sum of the marginal rates of 
substitution ( MRSg,c ) equals the number of inhabitants times MRSg,c  of the average 
inhabitant.)   
 
A decentralised equilibrium 
 
In a decentralised equilibrium we assume that the residents of a community decide on 
taxes and supply of goods from the public sector, and that they do so by majority vo-
ting.  With single-peaked preferences (which in our case follows from our assumptions 
about the utility functions and the distribution of individuals over residential 
preferences), this ensures a unique voting equilibrium, where the amount of local public 
goods supply is the amount preferred by the median voter. 
 
The maximisation problem that determines taxes and public goods supply in com-
munity 1 is therefore  
 
 max
g1
U α1m ,g1,c1( ), 
 
with m  denoting the median voter.  The first order condition for optimal choice of 1g  
is  
 
(35) Ug
m + Ucm dc1dg1 = 0  
 
Total change in per capita consumption of private differentiated goods due to increased 
provision of local public goods is 
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(36) 
dc1
dg1
= ∂c
1
∂g1 +
∂c1
∂L1
dL1
dg1
. 
 
The effect on private consumption of an increase in public goods supply may be split in 
two:  The first is the direct effect, as given by equation (22).  This is clearly negative.  
The second is the migration effect.  If an increase in g1 leads to a change in U1
M −U2M , 
there will be emigration or immigration.  A change in the number of residents leads to a 
change in per capita consumption of differentiated goods, as given by equation (23).  If 
L1 increases with increased g1, the second term of (36) is positive.  If, however, L1 
decreases as g1 increases, the second term of (36) is negative.  
 
Inserting (36) into (35) gives the first order condition for optimal supply of local public 
goods in community 1 as 
 
(37) Ug
m + Ucm ∂c1∂g1 +Uc
m ∂c1
∂L1
dL1
dg1
= 0. 
 
The migration effect depends on the direct effect on U1
M  of an increase in per capita 
supply of public goods in community 1.  Specifically, we must have 
 
(38) 
d(U1M −U2M )
dg1
= ∂(U1
M − U2M)
∂L1
dL1
dg1
+UgM + UcM ∂c1∂g1 = 0 . 
 
Define 
 
(39) S ≡ − ∂ (U1
M − U2M)
∂L1  , 
 
which is positive by the stability condition (equation (28)). 
 
Solving (38), we get 
 
(40) 
dL1
dg1
= 1
S
Ug
M +UcM ∂c1∂g1
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟  
 
Inserting (40) into (37) gives  
 
(41) Ug
m + Ucm ∂c1∂g1 +Uc
m ∂c1
∂L1
1
S
Ug
M +UcM ∂c1∂g1
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = 0 , 
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Define 
 
(42)  b ≡ ∂c
1
∂L1
1
S
, 
 
which is positive. 
 
Manipulating (41) then gives the following first order condition for the local choice of 
g1 
 
(43) 
Ugm
Uc
m + ∂c1∂g1
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ +
b
1 + b
UgM
Uc
M −
Ugm
Uc
m
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = 0 . 
 
(Ug
h Uc
h ) is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of publicly provided 
and private goods of person h , i.e. the marginal willingness to pay for an extra unit of 
the publicly provided good.  Call it MRSg,c . If MRSg,c  is increasing in α1 , the median 
resident has a higher MRSg,c  than the marginal inhabitant.  The second term of (44) is 
then negative, and the first term must be positive for the equality to hold.  Conversely, 
if MRSg,c  is decreasing in α1 , the second term is positive and the first term must be 
negative. 
 
Tax  competition or competition in public services? 
 
To interpret (43), consider first what it implies about the nature of competition between 
communities.  Suppose first that MRSg,c  is increasing in α1 ; i.e. that the marginal 
resident has a lower willingness to pay for publicly provided goods than the median 
voter.  What will the tax/public-goods reactions functions look like in the two-
community equilibrium?  The answer is straightforward: If community 2 raises taxes 
and increases its supply of public goods, marginal residents will move to community 1.  
That will lower the MRSg,c  of the marginal resident in community 1.  It will also lower 
the MRSg,c  of the median voter in community 1, as the new voters have a lower 
willingness to pay for public goods than the old ones.  Taxes and local supply of public 
goods in community 1 will therefore unambiguously decrease.  Thus, the reactions 
functions for public goods supply in the two communities must be downward-sloping. 
 
It is equally clear that there will be undersupply of public goods in both communities 
relative to the preferences of the median voters in equilibrium.  To see this, note that the 
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utility of the median voter in one community is increasing in the supply of public goods 
in the other community, as higher taxes there will induce people to move away.  Thus, 
the iso-utility curves for the median voters must be as shown in figure 2.  It follows that 
a cooperative solution between the median voters would entail higher taxes and greater 
supply of public goods in both communities, as indicated by the area I in figure 2.  
Thus, if MRSg,c  is increasing in α1 , we shall see tax competition between the com-
munities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If MRSg,c  is decreasing in α1 , we get the opposite result; i.e. competition in public ser-
vices and overprovision of public goods relative to the preferences of the median 
voters.  The verification of this is left to the reader. 
 
Efficiency 
 
To see how the decentralised equilibrium deviates from the efficient solution, it is 
instructive to rewrite (43) as 
 
(44) 
Ug
A
Uc
A + ∂c1∂g1
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ +
Ug
m
Uc
m −
Ug
A
Uc
A
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ +
b
1+ b
Ug
M
Uc
M −
Ug
m
Uc
m
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = 0  
 
mU1  
mU 2  
1g  
2g  
I 
Figure 2 
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Recall that the first order condition for efficient supply of local public goods in 
community 1 is 
 
 (33´) 
1
1
g
c
U
U
A
c
A
g
∂
∂−= . 
 
Thus, there are two sources of possible inefficiency.  The first is the cost-of-democracy 
wedge between the willingness to pay for public services of the median and the average 
voter.  The second is the distortion arising because of competition for residents between 
local authorities.  Both wedges could have either sign; so there is no a priori reason to 
believe that a democratic, decentralized solution will give systematic overprovision or 
underprovision of publicly provided goods.  Nor is there any reason to believe that the 
two have the same sign.  Thus, it could well be that decentralisation counteracts the 
democratic distortion; but it could equally well be that it magnifies it. 
 
The “European” vs the “American” case 
 
Whether the two sources of inefficiency reinforce or counteract each other depends on 
the distribution of residential preferences – specifically on whether the majority have 
strong residential preferences (the “European” case) or weak ones (the “American” 
case).  In the latter case, of course, it is more likely that we will have geographic 
concentration, in which case local tax competition is no longer an issue at all.  Barring 
that outcome, however, it follows from (44) that it is more likely that local autonomy 
creates serious distortions in the “American” than in the “European” case. 
 
To see that, note from figure 1 (p.11) above that in a symmetric equilibrium, the 
distribution of people in each community over residential preference will be skewed.  In 
the “American” case there will be overrepresentation in each community of people with 
α  close to zero; in the “European” case there will be overrepresentation of people with 
a relatively strong preference for living in the community, i.e. with α  quite different 
from zero.  Thus, in the “American” case, the median voter will have preferences 
somewhere between those of the marginal resident and the mean preferences, i.e. 
 
(45) α1M < α1m < α1A  The “American” case 
 
while in the “European” case, the mean preferences will be somewhere between those 
of the marginal resident and the median voter: 
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(46) α1M < α1A < α1m  The “European” case 
 
If, as many argue, tax aversion increases with mobility, therefore, tax competition to 
attract more people will be counteracted by the democratic bias in favour of the median 
voter in the “European” case, while it will be reinforced by the democratic bias in the 
“American” case.   Generally, the two wedges in (44) pull in opposite directions in the 
“European” case and the same direction in the “American case”. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have developed a framework to study tax competition and local public 
goods supply in a setting where real and fiscal externalities interact with local demo-
cracy, and we have used the framework (a) to analyse if there is any reason to believe 
that local autonomy generally will give a tax race to the bottom (there is not),  and (b) 
to look more closely at possible sources of oversupply or undersupply of publicly 
provided goods in a setting where local democracies compete in order to attract more 
people to the area.  We have identified two potential sources – the relationship between 
individual mobility and willingness to pay for publicly provided goods, and the 
mobility distribution of individuals (i.e. the distribution of individuals over residential 
preferences).  The two could reinforce each other in a local democracy if the majority 
of the residents in a community are relatively mobile (the “American” case), while they 
would pull in opposite directions if the majority of residents are relatively immobile 
(the “European” case). 
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